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INTRODUCTION
This study describes and analyzes the impact of the
Nigerian Indigenization Decree, strictly in terms of the
broad economic objectives which it pursues. In particular,
it seeks to achieve a greater participation of Nigerians
in the growth and destiny of the economy. The history,
origin and role of the Central Bank of Nigeria in the de¬
velopment of the economy - specifically, the creation of a
viable and financially sound sector, will be contrasted with
that of the commercial banks (comprised of expatriate and in
digenous banks).
The deforeignization of the economy, especially, the ex¬
patriate commercial banks is intended to improve the pattern
of bank location (which is generally urban biased to the com
parative neglect of the rural areas), and credit policies
(catering to an enclaved and dominant class). These prac¬
tices have discriminated against the indigenes and thereby
promoted an imbalance in regional development. The indigeni
zation was therefore an effort by the government to develop
all backward areas, thus, discouraging the rural-to-urban
immigration and the ensuing social problems that arises as
a result of displacement.
This period is particularly an interesting one, for it
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saw: the establishment of a federal system in Nigeria, the
attainment of internal self government, the achievement of
independence in 1960, the Civil War, the military era, or
the second Republic, and the change to a democratic form of
government.
The earliest attempt to regulate the 'Business of Bank¬
ing' in what was the 'Colony and protectorate of Nigeria,'
was made in May 1952, when the "First Bank Ordinance was
passed^
In April 1957, the Federal Government of Nigeria invited
a high official of the Bank of England, J. B. Loynes to
visit Nigeria, and advise them on the establishment of a
Federal Institution to perform appropriate central banking
functions, the introduction of Nigerian currency so as to pre¬
serve its external value and its acceptability within the
country, the relationship of the federal institution to the
commercial banks and the public, and the role of such an in¬
stitution in the development of a local money and capital
market.
After a thorough and extensive investigation, the Lyones
Report was presented in August 1957. And the issue of this
document, with the draft Banking Bill and Central Banking
Bill which it included, marked a turning point in history of
Banking in Nigeria and laid solid foundations for subsequent
development.
The draft bills were adopted with very few alternations
and were passed into law in March 1958, and completed in
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July 1959 when the new Central Bank of Nigeria became fully
operative.^
The main provision of the Central Bank Act can be
summarized as follows:
Under the Act, a Central Bank was established with the
principal objectives of issuing legal tender money in Nigeria;
maintaining external reserves; promoting monetary stability
and acting as a banker and financial adviser to the Federal
Government (it was required to hold all the paid-up capital
of the Government). The unit of currency was to be the Ni¬
gerian Pound f^n). divided into shillings and pence, with a
parity of one Nigerian Pound to one Pound Sterling. To main¬
tain parity, the Bank, was required to buy or sell Sterling
on demand for immediate delivery in London at rates laid down
subject to an amount of not more than ten thousand Pounds
(=fe 10,000), in respect of any one transaction.
Furthermore, the Bank was required to maintain at all
times, a reserve of external assets consisting mainly of gold
coin, or bullion. British Pound Sterling and Treasury Bills,
and other British Government securities (the composition of
external reserves was later modified).*
*The 1962 Amendment to the Central Bank Act, called for
a widening of the composition of CBN's external reserves
holdings to enable it include it in its official external re¬
serves assets denominated in currencies which are freely con¬
vertible into gold, or Sterling and was to include the fol¬
lowing: foreign bank balances, treasury bills of foreign
Governments, or those of international financial institutions.
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The Bank was given the usual powers to purchase, sell,
discount and rediscount Federal Government Treasury Bills
and inland bills of exchange, promisory notes arising out of
bonafide commercial transactions, or in connection with the
financing commercial transactions, or in connection with the
financing of seasonal agricultural operations. It was also
authorized to act as banker to other banks in Nigeria and
abroad; it was required to prescribe the minimum amount of
specified liquid assets to be held by the commercial banks
in Nigeria.
From the date of its inception, the Bank prescribed a
minimum liquidity ratio** of twenty-five per cent.^
The provisions of the Banking Act laid down: first,
that no banking business was to be transacted except by a
company licensed by the Ministry of Finance after consul¬
tation with the Central Bank. The minimum paid-up capital
for banks with head offices in Nigeria was retained at the
figures of $35,000 or tl2,500 laid down in 1952, but raised
5
from $28 ,000 to $56,000 for Expatriate banks.
Ne^t, a number of important restrictions were laid
down for licensed banks. Thus, a bank was prohibited from
**The original Act gave the CBN the power to prescribe
the liquidity ratio for the commercial banks, specified a
ratio of 25 per cent. The ratio was designed mainly to safe¬
guard the ability of the commercial banks to meet their de¬
positors cash withdrawals and ensure confidence in the bank¬
ing system. Later, Legislative amendments gave the CBN not
only the power to alter the composition of liquid assets for
the computation of the liquidity ratio., but also the liqui¬
dity ratio itself, which as a result became a tool of mone¬
tary control.
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granting facilities to any one person totalling more than 25
per cent of its paid-up capital and published reserves, ex¬
cept in certain cases involving the Produce Markeing Boards
exports, or another Bank/branch. As part of the regulations,
banks' were required to maintain at all times such holdings
of specified liquid assets as might be laid down by the Central
Bank. A Bank Examiner was appointed to examine periodically
the books and affairs of every licensed bank and report to
the Governor of the CBN, who was required to inform the Min¬
istry of Finance of any circumstances likely to call for
action.
THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); like any other cen¬
tral bank, discharges all the traditional function's of a
central bank. But, because Nigeria is a developing economy,
the central bank had to emphasize the developmental role.
Even, in discharging the traditional function of mone¬
tary control, it had relied more on direct rather than on
indirect control measures, because of the low levels of the
country's economic and financial development. For example,
it has been prescribing rates of credit for the commercial
banks since 1969 and Merchant Banks from 1977. But one
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should not lose sight of the fact that sectorial allocation
of credit suffers from the basic defect that funds may be
borrowed for one purpose and diverted to other purposes.
The developmental role (functions) emphasized by the
CBN, includes the promotion of the local money markets.
One of the main objectives of setting up the local money
market facilities in Nigeria was to stem the out-flow of
surplus funds into investment outlets in the London Money
Market/Capital markets and hence Nigerianize the credit base.
Other major reason included the enhancement of an effective
monetary management which a well developed money market
would provide the monetary authorities; and the promotion of
commercial bank's management of their portfolio of assets
and liabilities.
To promote the indigenous money market, the CBN de¬
signed and issued the "First Nigerian Treasury Bill" in 1960.
This was followed by the introduction of Treasury Certifi¬
cates in 1968. But before then, it established in 1962, a
'Call Money Fund' Scheme*** for investing temporary funds of
commercial banks and other financial institutions on over-
***The CBN introduced a 'Call Money Fund' that pro¬
vided the commercial banks and other financial institutions
with an overnight investment of their surplus funds. Under
the Scheme, participating financial institutions were re¬
quired to maintain for clearing purposes minimum balances
with the CBN, while any excess over the minimum balances were
lent to the call money fund at interest rates slightly lower
than the Treasury Bill rate.
-7-
night basis. This scheme was however, terminated in July
1974,^ at a time when large increases in government revenue
made it unnecessary to sustain the continued operation of the
Scheme.
The growth rates of commercial banks accelerated with
regard to deposit liabilities (See Table 1 for data supporting
the high liquidity of the Nigerian economy). As a result,
three new major money market instruments were designed and
O
introduced by the CBN between 1974 and 1978, to provide the
commercial banks with outlets for their fast growing idle
funds. These new Money Markets instruments are:
i) CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSITS (CD); aimed at facilitating the
channeling of commercial banks surplus funds into the mer¬
chant banks. The main feature of the CD included a maturity
range of 3.36 months and a wholesale unit issue of N50,000
or $75,000;
ii) BANKERS UNIT FUND (BUF); to provide an avenue for short¬
term investment of commercial banks funds in government de¬
velopment stocks. Participants were to invest in multiples
of N10,000 in stocks of various maturities; and
iii) ELIGIBLE DEVELOPMENT STOCKS (EDS); under the eligible
development stocks, government development stocks of not
more than three years maturity were designated "Eligible
Stocks" for the purpose of meeting banks specified liquid
assets requirements.
The development of an Indigenous Capital market had



















Dec. 1970 342.3 266.0 608.4 43.7
Dec. 1971 354.5 274.4 628.9 43.6
Dec. 1972 385.2 315.0 700.2 45.0
Dec. 1973 435.9 391 .3 827.2 47.3
Dec. 1974 569.8 608.5 1,178.3 51 .6
Dec. 1975 1 ,013.7 1,013.4 2,044.1 49.6
Dec. 1976 1,540.0 1 ,941 .8 3,481.8 59.0
-Money supply is defined as currency outside banks plus de¬
mand deposits at commercial banks plus domestic deposits
with the Central Bank, less federal and state governments
demand deposits at commercial banks.
-Demand (current) deposits with banking systems net of govern¬
ment (federal and state) deposits.
Source: CBN Economic and Financial Review, Volume 15, #2,
December 1977, p. 72,
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cipated in the planning and setting up of Lagos Stock Ex¬
change. The CBN, actively participated and promoted the
growth of the Lagos Stock Exchange during the early years
of its inception by giving it financial support in the form
of annual subvention or appropriatin.** The Nigerian Stock
Exchange (NSE) have now three branches: Lagos, Kaduna, and
Port-Harcourt. The NSE deals in Government securities which
are issued and managed by the CBN, and private securities
and debentures which have increased both in volume and value.
The CBN contributed immensely to the successful financ¬
ing of the Indigenous Enterprise Promotion Scheme (contri¬
bution figures ranges from ^30, to N200 million). In an
effort to encourage financial institutions to provide the
desired credit to finance the purchase of shares and busi¬
nesses by Nigerians under the first and second phases of the
Indigenisation Scheme, loans granted for this purpose by com¬
mercial banks are to be excluded from the 30 per cent ceil-
ic'k'k
ing on credit expansion.
Another way in which the CBN has contributed to the
development of the financial system and the Nigerian economy
is through participation in the establishment of specialized
financial institutions, such as the Nigerian Industrial De-
**In three years (1963-65), CBN cash subvention to the
Stock Exchange amounted to H14,000,or $ 21 ,000.
***Monetary policy, circular number 10. "Financing the
Indigenisation Scheme" 1978/79 (internal memo), Lagos, CBN
Research Department, 1978.
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velopment Bank in 1964. The total resources of the NIDB have
grown from an initial amount of N8.5 million to N97.6 million
in 1977. As of 1976, the CBN held 94.2 per cent of NIDB
capital equity. The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
established April 2, 1973, with an authorized capital of
H50 million of which N10 million was paid up. The NBCI's
main function is to provide equity capital and loans for
long and medium term investment to indigenous persons and
bodies engaged in industry and commerce; the Nigerian Agri¬
cultural Bank (NAB) was established in April 1973, with an
initial appropriation of N12 million from the Federal Govern-
g
ment; and the Federal Mortgage Bank established in 1977.
The CBN, advised the Government and carried through
the set up of a NlOO million Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Fund in 1977, to guarantee commercial and merchant banks
agricultural credits up to 75 per cent. These are aimed at
increasing the flow of credit to the agricultural sector in
feeding the nation, foreign reserve earnings and providing
industrial raw materials. During the five-year period of its
existence, (1973/74 to 1977/78), the NAB approved a total of
N286.3 million for 177 projects and disbursed N124.4 million,
priority being given to small scale farmers in its lending
, . 10
policy.
The CBN also contributes significantly to economic re¬
search and the assembly of economic and financial statistics
because of its wealth of experts and high level manpower.
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Data collection are very essential for objective plannings
by individuals, institutions and the nation. Its publi¬
cations, such as the Annual Report, Economic and Financial
Review, Official Gazette Supplement, and the Monthly Reports
are concrete evidence of the CBN's contributions.
The commercial banks on the other hand continues to
be an urban-oriented service. Very little money has really
flown in to the (agricultural) rural areas (sectors) from or¬
ganized banking industry so far. This is in sharp contrast
to the role played by the Central Bank which have increased
the flow of credit to the agricultural sector with the aid
of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund.
In a country where agriculture plays and contributes
nearly half of the national output, hardly one per cent of
the total bank credit is made available to this sector. It
is a great paradox, that this sector has managed to subsist
with hardly one per cent of the organized credit flowing to it
all these years. But modern farming (advocated by the national
planners) needs large amount of capital inputs to improve the
level and quality of all aspects of agricultural production.
The credit policies of the commercial banks are dis-
criminately in nature (mainly against the indigenes), and little
inclination is shown to extend credit to the Nigerian mer-
chants/farmers. The concentration of lending on foreign-
owned and operated businesses led to the development of an
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enclave economy. This practice was prevalent among the
Expatriate Commercial Banks.
In view of the low levels of income enjoyed by most
Nigerians, the Indigenous Banks encouraged small demand,
time, and savings deposits. They were very happy to accept
savings account on which the average balance is very small
and the number of transactions high. The Expatriate Banks
in contrast, would consider many of them wholly uneconomic.
This is one of the major reasons why rural savings have not
been fully mobilized.
STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN NIGERIA BEFORE THE DECREE
The structure of commercial banks in Nigeria before
the passage of the "Indigenisation Decree,falls under
the following description:
aa). Expatriate Banks: Under the category, there were
seven banks with entirely foreign owned capital; incorporat¬
ed outside the country. Some of these banks maintained
only one office in Nigeria with the exception of three banks,
which had more than one branch;
bb). Government-Owned Indigenous Banks: By the end of 1970,
there were only six indigenous banks whose capital was owned
mainly by the Regional Governments through one or more
Regional Public Corporation(s). These banks began as private
indigenous banks incorporated in and maintaining head offices
-12-
in Nigeria. The banks are: National Bank of Nigeria Limit¬
ed (1933), Agbon-Magbe Bank (1945), African Continential
Bank (1947), Cooperative Bank of Eastern Nigeria (1962),
Cooperative Bank of Western Nigeria (1962), and the Bank of
the North (1959).
cc). Private Indigenous Banks: There are only two of these
banks the Muslim Bank, incorporated in 1958, and the Birini
Bank, incorporated in 1945.
dd). Mixed Banks: In this category, there were three banks:
the Bank of the North; the Bank of Lagos; and the Merchant
Bank. They were partly owned on the basis of the capital/
share holding,they were incorporated respectively in 1952 and
1959.
All the commercial banks in Nigeria and their branches
were located mainly in Urban areas with populations ranging
from 30,000 to 50,000. Commercial banks offices increased
from 66 in December, 1959 to 276 in December, 1970 (See the
Table 2. For detailed and vigorous analysis, please
see the chapter on commercial banking). These new branches
are located mainly in the main centers of commercial activi¬
ties. Conversely, a few branches were located in predomin¬
antly agricultural areas, which means that the problem of
easy-credit availability and savings remains unresolved.
The pattern of location of commercial banks seems to
follow the colonial pattern. Such offices were syn¬
chronous with colonial administration, providing services
Table 2 -12a-
Licensed Commercial Banks in Nigeria since 1970




Standard Bank of West
Africa (Nigeria, LTD) 67 London
Barclays Bank 89 London
Banque de L' Afrique
Occidentale 4 Pari s
Bank of India 1 Bombay
Bank of America 2 San Francisco
Chase Manhattan Bank 1 New York
Government-Owned Indigenous
African Continental Bank 33 Lagos







Western Nigeria 7 Ibadan
United Bank for Africa 15 Lagos
Private Indiqenous
Berini Bank 2 Lagos
Muslim Bank 6 Kano
Mi xed
Bank of Lagos 1 Lagos
Bank of the North 4 Kano
Merchant Bank 1 Lagos
SOURCE:
Central Bank of Nigeria. Bank Examiner's Office.
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catering to the needs of the enclave economies and the major
participants therein, and their policies discriminatedly
1 2
against the Nigerian indigenes.
Of all the banks listed on Table 2, only about 15 per
cent of the total number of banks branches are located in the
rural areas, while a hefty 54 per cent of these banks serve
*
the large urban centres.
Indigenization is the word used to describe the take
over of foreign business and firms by Nigerians. These stems
from an old African story - "Foreign banks lack the desire
to serve the needs of a developing society, while the Indi-
1 3
genous banks lacks the means."
In 1972, the then military government introduced an
'Indigenization Decree' in a Government White Paper release,
1 4
the Decree was to become operative on April 1, 1974.
There were three categories:
Schedule 1, were small business, 22 in number, which should
be wholly owned by Nigerians;
Schedule 2, covered more sophisticated medium and large
scale industries. Here, the requirement was that there
should be a minimum of 60 per cent Nigerian ownership; and
Schedule 3, envisaged a minimum Nigerian equity partici¬
pation of 40 per cent in all enterprises not included in
★
The concept "rural" and "urban" are being rather loosely
used in this paper, since my distinction between the two is
based entirely on population size. For more rigorous defi¬
nition of these terms, see L. Atkin, Mabogunje, "Cities and
Social Order" (Ibadan: University Press 1974).
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Schedule 1 and 2.
How did the Indigenisation Decree affect foreign
banks? In the Enterprising Decree, the government decreed
that "the controlling share in all formerly foreign domir
nated banks; must be in Nigeria, principally government
hands."
This decree while differing in detail, provide for at
least 60 per cent Nigerian ownership of the affected banks.
Thus, for example, Barclays Bank of Nigeria, which had 48.33
per cent Nigerian public and private participation was re¬
quired to transfer an additional 11.67 per cent of its shares
1 5
to the government.
The Nigerian Indigenisation Decree is totally justified
in strictly economic terms as well as in terms of the broad
objectives which it pursued and shall continue to pursue, so
as to ensure that the hopes and aspirations of millions of
Nigerians are not sacrificed. The more one examines the
manner in which most commercial banks in the country were
functioning, one is led to the view th&t this measure was in¬
escapable and absolutely necessary.
The purpose of the Indigenisation was to promote rapid
growth in agriculture, small industries and exports (non¬
minerals). To encourage new enterpreneurs and to develop all
backward areas. The Nigerian Enterprise Decree was not a
historic step, but rather, it is a step in the right direct¬
ion towards greater participation of Nigerians in the growth
-15-
and destiny of the economy. It assured improved and extended
services.
As I have indicated earlier, there has been serious im¬
balance in the development of banking facilities in different
regions within the country.
There is an urgent need to expand banking facilities
in the states and regions which are 'underbanked'. Even in the
developed , states banking facilities are confined to urban areas
especially to the metropolitan areas to the comparative ne¬
glect of the semi-urban and rural areas. This has led to the
complaint that banks mobilize resources in the form of deposits
in certain areas and utilize them elsewhere thus aggrevating,
if not promoting imbalance regional development.
The role that any commercial banking system has to
play in a developing economy such as Nigeria, is to mobilize
the savings of the nation, provide the cheap means of payment
and allocate credit in such a way as to produce productivity
in all sectors. It was expected by the decree planners that
the Central Bank of Nigeria would see to it that these ob¬
jectives were realized.
CHAPTER II
WHAT EXACTLY DOES INDIGENIZATION MEAN?
It is a new policy within the context of Nigeria, and
thus needs elucidation. With the promugation of the Indigen-
ization Decree in 1972, indigenization meant a transfer of
proprietary interest in a business organization from foreign¬
ers to Nigerians. Indigenization, however, is not to be view¬
ed as synonymous with "Nationalization." According to E. F.
Schumacher, Nationalization when properly used means merely
ownership by a body representing .... the general public of
consumers.^ ^
Nationalization extinguishes private proprietary rights,
but does not by itself determine what is to become of the
original ownership rights and who is to exercise them, since
ownership is not a single right but a bundle of rights. There¬
fore, Nationalization is a purely negative measure which annu¬
ls previous arrangements and creates the opportunity and ne¬
cessity to make new ones.
The transfer of ownership in Nigeria took the form of
purchase and not the form of expropriation. According to CBN
statistics, about 1,200 companies sold their shares to Ni¬
gerians as of December 31, 1977. Total number of shares sold
through the Nigerian stock exchange was about 318.5 million
valued at 235.8 million Naira or $353.7.^^ Also, private
-16-
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proprietary rights were not extinguished as is the case with
nationalization. Furthermore, the new owners for the most
part were private citizens and state governments when buyers
were not found.
The Nigerian indigenization was a measure brought into
force by the government to greatly increase the local share¬
holding in foreign companies operating in the country, many
of them British. The Nigerian indigenization was a gradual
attempt to deforeignize the country’s economy. It does mean
that the indigenous Nigerians would assume greater flexibility
and responsibility for the ownership and management of the
modern sector.
POSTULATES OF INDIGENIZATION
The most frequently mentioned reason for indigenization
was the fear of economic domination from abroad. This argu¬
ment has been debated from many points of view.
For instance, V. I. Bello, former Secretary of the Ni¬
gerian Enterprises Promotion Board noted that "political in¬
dependence without economic emancipation was a sham," and
that a political regime which does not and cannot harness the
economic resources within its political boundaries is more or
1 8
less tottering.
This fear of foreign economic control was echoed by
Professor Pita N. Ejiofoor, a Nigerian economist who felt that
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indigenization was at the heart of Nigeria's effort to take
1 9
its economic destiny into its own hands. The aim of the
1972 Indigenization Decree, he maintains was to do away with
the foreign domination of the country's commerce and indus¬
try. According to an editorial in the Financial Times (United
Kingdom), British investment in Nigeria excluding oil, banking
and insurance are conservatively estimated at N250 million or
$460 million. When retail and wholesale trades which are do¬
minated exclusively by the Lebanese, Syrians, Cypriots, Greeks
and Asians. The estimated increases to about $736 million or
^k400million.^°
The then permanent secretary of the Federal Ministry of
Economic Development and Reconstruction, I. F. Ebong, stated
that" ... indigenization is one of the strategic aims of the
second national development plan," because experience in the
past has shown that political independence is nothing but an
21
empty shel1.
Babatunde Jose, former chairman of the influential
Daily Times Group Companies (Nigeria), felt that the raison
d'etre of the indigenization scheme introduced by the Federal
22
Government was to give economic power to Nigerians. He
welcomed the new measures; nevertheless, made the point that
it would be necessary to ensure that the transfer of owner¬
ship did not lead to a fall in productivity. He suggested
that seminars and workshops should be organized to educate
prospective business owners, particularly those intending to
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buy sole ownership of enterprises on the responsibilities
which indigenization places on them to ensure that there is no
fall in output.
In 1974, the president of the Nigerian Economic Society,
A. E. Ekukinam, expressed that Nigeria's indigenization policy
had only one meaning and that was the reservation of certain
types of business activities exclusively for Nigerian owner-
23
ship. -This point of view is stressed in schedule one which
listed more than 17 sectors of the economy which must be 100
per cent owned by Nigerians,
24
The Trevor Report, cited by proponent of the Decree
helped fuel the fire. For it contends that expatriates, most¬
ly those in the banking sphere, have high standards of credit
worthiness. Their credit and advance policies were "extremely
conservative." In addition the banks executives are all Europeans
lacking the intimate social relationship with Africans (mainly
Nigerians) which the authors believe to be essential for the
successful finance of indigenous enterprises.
Throughout the indigenization debates, it was fashion¬
able to argue that large foreign investment meant exploitation
of the country in the form of high remittance of profits to
overseas investors. The argument claimed that foreign capi¬
talist exploited Nigeria at will and that this would have to
end. This patriotic argument had a powerful influence for
it swayed and attracted a lot of sympathizers.
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WHAT HAS NEO-COLONIALISM TO DO WITH THE PROGRAM?
The Nigerian quest for economic independence was pre¬
sented in terms of neo-colonialism. The late charismatic
leader of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, spread these sentiments
vigorously in Africa. He insisted that despite decoloni¬
zation in Africa, the former colonial powers wanted to keep
25
Africa economically and politically subservint. ‘
Necolonialism, in Nkrumah views, manoeuvered men and
governments; it created client states and despite nominal in
dependence, the former colonial powers wanted to keep and
2 6
sought to thwart and corrupt true independence.
Neo-colonialism is not a precise term, it is what the
East Germans call Sammelbergriff - an umbrella term, as it
covers the totality of difficult form and methods of exploi¬
tation and oppression of economically weak and undeveloped
countries controlled by imperalism. Therefore, neo-colonial
ism in the former colonies of Africa signifies an expression
of economic as well as political grievances against exploi¬
tation.
Though obscured, the vital but bitter truth is that in¬
dependence, like patriotism is not enough; instant freedom
does not mean instant prosperity. Generally the emerging
nation does not have the resources to be self sufficient.
It, therefore, has to depend on the non-mineral primary
-21-
products export for the vast majority of its foreign exchange
earnings. This earning is used to import the raw materials,
machinery, capital goods, and intermediate producer goods and
consumer goods both to fuel their industrial expansion and to
satisfy the rising consumption aspiration of their people.
Nost non-petroleum-rich developing nations, import de¬
mands have exceeded the capacity to generate sufficient reve¬
nues from the sales of exports because the prices of primary
commodities have declines relative to manufactured goods
(imports). This has led to chronic "deficits" on their
2 7
balance-of-payment vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
The most plausible interpretation of economic indepen¬
dence would be that of solvency, which Professor Peter T.
Bauer of London, defines as "the ability of a country to pay
for their goods and services without recourse to external
28
grants and subsidized loans." Professor Bauer believes that
bilateral public aid, be it given by France or any other
nation (developed), has political conditions attached to it.
It is not gratuitous generosity, and it would be childish to
deny the political, or commercial motivations behind what is
variously called aid, technical assistance or cooperation.
Therefore, the fear of foreign economic domination to¬
gether with the neo-colonial argument was widely used during
the debate of the 1972 Indigenization Decree, and it has had
a powerful influence.
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MAXIMUM RETENTION OF PROFITS
The experience of the world's poor countries with
foreign investment has been marked by a curious phenomenon:
in comparison to the world's rich countries. A much higher
proportion of earnings is sent home rather than reinvested
in the underdeveloped countries. This practice has had a
substantial impact on balance of payments problem in the new
countries.
According to the data supplied by the U.S. Department
★
of Commerce (See Table 3) the receipt of income as a per¬
centage of direct investment over the years 1970-76, and it
clearly showed that foreign investment in developing countries
has been a very profitable business.
In 1970, $51,819 million was invested in developed
countries. The percentage return on this investment was 4.7,
and the dollar receipts of income was $2,435 (.047 x 51,819),
while $19,192 million was invested in developing countries in
1970, the percentage return on this investment was 12.2 and
the dollar receipt of income was $2,340.
In 1974, $19,812 million was invested in developing
countries and the percentage return on investment reached an
*




RECEIPTS OF INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF DIRECT U.S. INVESTMENT
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Developed Countries
Direct Investment Position 51,819 56,950 62,000 72,214 83,025 90,923 101,150
Receipts of Income 2,436 2,775 2,911 3,875 4,892 4,609 5,217
Percentage Return 4.7 4.9 4.7 5.7 5.9 5.1 5.2
Developing Countries
Direct Investment Position 19,192 20,719 22,274 22,904 19,812 26,222 29,050
Receipts of Income 2,340 2,712 3,079 4,272 6,086 3,619 5,763
Percentage Return 12.2 13.1 13.8 18.6 30.7 13.8 19.8
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business (United States Department of Commerce), August, 1977, Table 2.
-23-
all time high of 30.7, while only 5.9 percentage return was
realized from $83,025 million invested in developed countries.
Therefore, foreign investment in developing countries con¬
tinues to provide a substantial higher return than in de¬
veloped countries.
It would be of great interest to know, even very broad¬
ly what proportion of the profits made by foreign enterprises
in Nigeria is actually reinvested in the country. Accurate
figures are not available. However, the Central Bank of
Nigeria, annual survey of foreign private investment in Ni-
pQ
geria for 1975, estimates that in 1974, of the $760.65
million, profits amounting to $688.2 million was
transferred from Nigeria to Europe, and only $72.45 million
of profits was reinvested.
According to Pierre Jalee, figures dealing with trade
and production can be regarded as firm data, beyond question
except for small marginal errors in the groupings used. He
cautioned that one must exercise the greatest reserve when it
comes to the profits on the undertakings and private invest¬
ments of the imperialist countries in the Third World. In
this field, official statistics and public service records,
however, technically correct, can only apply to the officially
acknowledge portion of such profits which often bears only
30
a distant relation to the whole.
•k
It was argued during the indigenization debate, that
*
Maximum retention of profits earned in Nigeria argument.
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i ndi geni zati on would benefit Nigeria's balance of payments
because it would considerably reduce the amount of profits
remitted to Europe.
Multinational corporations in Nigeria not only use local
savings to finance their equity investment, but also draw
more heavily than do domestic firms on local credit markets
for short-term working capital loans. For every dollar of
net profits earned by a MNC subsidairy (Nigeria), 52 per cent
will leave the country even though 78 per cent of the invest¬
ment funds used to generate the dollar of profit came from
local resources.
In fact, studies show that MNC's operate on roughly one
and one-half to two times the level of indebtedness of their
31domestic competition for any given level of total assets.
Again the use of largely local savings, in this case working
capital, makes possible a productive activity the profits
which largely benefits recipients external to the local
economy.
The indigenous business community of Nigeria, as a
rule, does not transfer profits and dividends earned abroad,
except for buying luxury imported goods, and thus, it was
claimed that indigenization would help ease the demand for
convertible foreign exchange. The profits earned by the
indigenous business community would be ploughed back into
domestic investment, and would not be dissipated abroad ot
32
stashed away in numbered Swiss bank account.
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At face value, the local retention of profits argument
enjoyed considerable support among Nigerian intellectuals.
It was and still is a patroitic argument and emotionally, it
swayed many minds,
INDIGENIZATION EXPERIENCE IN AFRICA
In the preparation of the original indigenization
Decree the effects of indigenization attempted in Uganda, Kenya
and Ghana played a considerable part. The Nigerian Enter¬
prise Promotion Decree of 1972 was modelled after the Ghana¬
ian Business Promotion Act of 1970 in which expatriate busi-
*
nesses were required to be turned over to Ghanaian owner-
33
ship within a prescribed time.
Africanization of the civil service got underway soon
after the end of the World War II, but it was a slow process
as long as the various territories remain colonies.
After independence, sweeping Africanization of the material,
human and institutional infrastructures took place in the new
countries, but trade, industry, export and import business,
banking, insurance, publishing and advertising remained main¬
ly in alien hands. The leaders of the newly-independent
countries knew that eventually, something would have to be
done to change this state of affairs.
A panel was set up to determine the fair values of the
expatriate business, after which they were bought out by
Ghanians.
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In 1956, Egypt took over the Suez Canal Company.
It was the first experiment in economic nationalism or simply
self reliance on the African continent and the leaders of the
new countries strove to emulate it.
Uganda's effort in the indigenization of its economy
in 1968 was indicative of things to come. The government
of Milton Obote wanted to begin the task, A special commis¬
sion on Africanization of commerce and industry report stated
that ". . . Uganda's commercial and industry was predominantly
in the hands of non-Africans most of whom are non-citizens."
The report went on to say that if this imbalance was
not corrected before it was too late, a serious social and
political situation might develop from which it would be very
35
difficult for the country to extricate itself.
The proposed Ugandan!zation called for the passing of
a Trade Licensing Act, which would exclude non-citizens from
carrying-on business in certain specified business areas as
well as in designated parts of the country. It also recom¬
mended the introduction of an Industrial Development Agency
36
and the training of Ugandans for management posts.
The process of Ugandan!zation was to be gradual, but
it did not turn out that way. Uganda was a country which
indigenized in what might be called the "hooray" style. In
early 1971, General Idi Amin ousted President Milton Obote,
and on August 9, 1972, he ordered some 40,000 Asians to
-27-
-
leave the country within three months. As an African nation
alists, "Amin believe that Africa was strictly for Africans
and that in economic matters, it was time for Africans to
37
start calling the tune."
Anti Asianism was unquestionably an important ingredi¬
ent of African nationalism and it certainly was a catalyst
that precipitated Amin's action. He had no compulsion in
expelling technicians, psysicians, teachers and government
support personnel and officials.
In addition to Asians, Uganda also employed 7000
British expatriate administrators to run various government
offices. Amin expelled many Englishmen, as well in utter dis
regard of the immediate consequences to the welfare of the
38
country. By early 1973, Uganda's economy was in the dol¬
drums and was slowly crumbling.
In neighbouring Kenya, where between 70,000 and 90,000
Asians also had profound economic and administrative grip on
39
the new country, anti-Asian sentiment was part and parcel
of the existing populist ideology. The anti-Asian-folk con¬
sciousness manifested itself through the prism of the Asian
stereotype.
Kenyans made no secret of the fact that they consider¬
ed Asians avaricious thieves, who abused their women and
cheated all of them.
*
Prior to the expulsion, Amin gave the Asians a chance
to nationalize and become permanent residents of Uganda.
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Kenya, like other African countries, had inherited a
state of affairs in which non-Africans were richer than
Africans. It was non-Africans who owned the businesses in
*
the main streets and industrial areas of Kenya. The late
Tom Mboya felt that his characteristic of the Kenyan economy
40
should be eliminated.
The Kenyan government was aware of this deep rooted re¬
sentment which was a powder-keg ready for explosion. In the
mid-1960s, the government initiated the policy of indigeni-
zation, designed to eliminate Asians from trade and commerce
within the country's economy.
Up to the present, the process of Kenyanization has been
a gradual one, adhering to an orderly policy. Kenya's pri¬
mary device in pursuing the goal of Kenyanization has been the
licensing system (non-renewal of licenses for Asian shop-
. 4'i
keepers).
To make a dent in the foreign economic domination, the
Ghanaian government promulgated the Business Promotion Act
4?
of 1970. As of August, 1970, the Lebanese, Indian,
Syrian businesses had to be turned over to Ghanaian owner¬
ship in the prescribed industries. Aliens (shopkeepers and
sales proprietors) were strongly entrenched in Ghana's service
industries where they performed a necessary but unpopular
•k
Note, that there was no mention of anti-white senti¬
ments throughout this discussion. Simply because white
(settlers) are part of Kenyan populace.
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middleroan function. They lived apart from the rest of
★
the Ghanaians and did not really like Africans. Ghanaians,
of course reciprocated, and the press often created the im¬
pression that alien businessmen were crooks, exploiters and
undesirables.
The Business Promotion Act, was a popular piece of
legislation for the Ghanaians, for it represented the be¬
ginning of the final phase of decolonization. To further
this goal of independence, this decree simply eliminated
foreign businessmen from medium-sized businesses. They had
to sell out to genuine (that is, not frontmen) Ghanaian
businessmen as of a certain date. The government wanted to
make sure that the country's retail trade was dominated by the
43
indigenes.
This step was designed not only to make Ghana more
self-reliant economically in terms of owning and running the
businesses in certain sectors of the economy, but also to
minimize the loss of foreign exchange which was brought
about by regular repatriation of earnings of alien business¬
men and traders.
The publication of the Business Promotion Act, almost
coincided with the compulsory repatriation fo thousands of
Africans aliens including Nigerians (many of whom were in
business at Ghana) in December 1969. This large scale ex-
★
This is rather suggestive and can not be carefully
substantiated with proofs.
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pulsion of Africans from Ghana demonstrated that the concept
of indigenization should not be equated with Africanization,
because the Ghanaians expelled from their territory, Niger-
44
ians, Togolese, Malians and Dahomians. Although, the indi-
genization policies in different countries have not been
identical, they all provided examples for each other to
follow. Therefore, since the first decade of African in¬
dependence was devoted to national consolidation and nation
building, the second decade seems to have been devoted to
building-up economic self-reliance. The resulting emulation
effect seems to have played a role as a catalyst in the
i n d i genization process in Nigeria.
NIGERIAN INDIGENIZATION SO FAR
The Indigenization Decree began in earnest with the pro¬
mulgation of the Nigerian Indigenization Enterprise Scheme of
1972, which took effect on April 1, 1974. The Nigerian
Enterprise Promotion Board was to run and implement the new
decree, its chairman was the permanent secretary in the Min¬
istry of Industries. Upon launching the decree, the govern¬
ment also appointed a panel to probe the effectiveness of
the original indigenization decree first introduced in 1972.
The panel was ordered to report by March.
Under the original decree which became operative on
46
April 1, 1974, there were two categories. Under Schedule I,
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were small businesses, 22 in number which passed entirely
into Nigerian ownership. These were mostly service indus¬
tries like hair dressing, baking, advertising, public re¬
lations, public transports etc. Schedule II covered more
sophisticated medium and large scale industries. Here, the
requirement was that they should be 40 per cent Nigerian
owned.
The decree affected many foreign firms, mainly British
firms involved in 42 per cent of the cases, French firms
followed with 10 per cent and United States with 7 per cent.
United Kingdom enterprises accounted for the bulk of take¬
overs in agriculture, banking, insurance and to a lesser ex¬
tent, trade. Most of these investments had been made while
the countries were under colonial rule. In contrast. United
States enterprises accounted for most of the takeover in
47
mining, petroleum, manufacturing and public utilities.
Here is a partial listing of British firms and some
French firms affected by the decree: Guinness, Dunlop,
United African Company (a subisdiary of Lonrho), Leventis,
Peterson Zochonis (which play a major role in the country's
distribution systems). Engineering companies such as Taylor
Woodrow, Costain, Frank and Rutley, Mooney Construction
Company (MCC). British investment in Nigeria excluding oil,
banking and insurance conservatively estimated at =^^250
48
million or $460 million. According to Mr. Alan Wood,
Chairman of Guinness Nigeria, his company has a total in-
-32-
yes traent capital of $18.4 million or mi 11 i on in Nigeria.^^
The government also decreed that the controlling share
in all formerly foreign dominated banks must be in Nigerian,
principally government hands. After a series of marathon ne¬
gotiation, the final agreements while differing in detail,
provide for at least 60 per cent Nigerian ownership of the
★
affected banks. Thus, for example, Barclays Bank of Nigeria
which had 48.33 per cent Nigerian public and private parti¬
cipation was required to transfer an additional 11.67 per
50
cent of Its shares to the government.
The price for any shares transferred was calculated on
the basis of the book value plus some estimate of the future
51
earnings. This method penalized both the older commercial
banks whose assets carried a depreciated book value, and
constituted a hidden unvalued reserve.
Some of the foreign firms and individuals affected felt
that the price at which they have been obligated to sell
their shares has been low in relation to the value and pro¬
spects of the business. Correspondingly, many Nigerians,
including employees of the companies themselves have secured
bargains. And at the prices at which the sales have taken
place, there have been no shortage of buyers, even at the
*Changed name to Union Bank in 1979 as a result of
pressure from and boycott from the government because of the
parent corporation connection with South Africa. For further
details, see Times (London) June 5, 1978, p. 17.
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end of the process, when many thought that money might run
out. In some cases, state governments have had to step-in
and in a few cases there have been no buyers for small busi-
52
ness.
On the other hand, although spokesmen of some of the
affected companies have expressed satisfaction about the
geographical "spread" of the share purchasers, there has
been apprehension that too many of the shares are now in the
hands of too few individuals, concentrated mainly in the
Lagos area where the headquarters of most of the companies
are situated. This has thereby created a new class of
53
millionaires what in Uganda were called "black Asians."
It was stipulated that the board of directors and
chairmen are to be majority Nigerian. In the past, the
bank boards had at least token Nigerian membership but only
some of the larger banks such as Standard Bank Nigeria had
54
indigenous chairmen.
The authorities stressed that the banks should con¬
tinue to operate under "sound commercial banking principles"
and towards this end, the foreign partners were to provide tech¬
nical and managerial assistance designed to maintain effect¬
ive credit and audit control at their affiliates. The man¬
aging director and all "senior executives" are to be ex¬
perienced commercial bankers.
The panel under the chairmanship of 0, A. Adeosun,
managing director of the Nigerian stockholders in their re-
-34-
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port looked back critically on many aspects of the exercise;
at the same time it suggested additions to Schedule I [busi¬
ness which should be wholly owned by Nigerians], and Schedule
II [minimum 60 per cent Nigerian ownership] and also proposed
a Schedule III which envisages a minimum Nigerian equity par¬
ticipation of 40 per cent, in all enterprises not included in
Schedule I and II [See Table 4.].
The panel in their report on the problem of indigeni-
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zation so far have been twofold; firstly, there have been
downright evasion and dishonesty; secondly, there have been
what one might term structural failures - the spread of owner¬
ship of foreign owned businesses has been concentrated into
few hands creating a new class of rich Nigerians.
In principles, indigenization has done little more than
transfer the ownership of business from a group of rich fore-
igners to a group of equally rich Nigerians, This has been
good for nationalism and Nigerian pride, but it has done lit¬
tle for social justice. In terms of general welfare and re¬
distribution of income to the majority of Nigerians, the ef¬
fect of the indigenization decree have been negative - if not
counter productive - in the sense that it has enormously in¬
creased the economic and attendant political control of the
new shareholders.
The panel also found that the main devices used to cir¬
cumvent the decree included; "fronting, application for
naturalization, extended use of the definition of Nigerian
citizenship, interpretational problems of classification of
-35-
Table 4.
THE NIGERIAN INDIGENIZATION ENTERPRISING DECREE
NEW SCHEDULE ONE (ENTERPRISES TO BE WHOLLY OWNED BY NIGERIANS)
1. Cosmetics and perfumery manufactures.
2. Supermarkets and Departmental stores having a turnover of less
than Niara 0 2 million per annum.
3. Distribution agencies excluding motor vehicles, machinery
and equipment and spare parts.
4. Estate agency.
5. Furniture making.
6. Manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, handbags, purses,
wallets, portfolios and shopping bags,
7. Passenger bus services of any kind,
8. Poultry farming,
9. Printing of stationary (when not associated with printing
of books),
10. Slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat.
11. Travel agencies,
12. Wholesale distributors (of local manufactured and other
locally produced goods),
13. Commercial transportation (wet and dry cargo and fuel),





Enterprises which for reasons of public policy should be con¬
trolled by Nigerians in equity and management terms. These
should be enterprises which, by their nature, are of strategic
imporatnce to the economy. In this connection, the Federal
Panel recommends that government sponsored institutions and
private Nigerian citizen should have not less than 60 per
cent equity interest in the following areas;
ADDITION TO EXISTING SCHEDULE II.
1. Supermarkets and departmental stores having a turnover of
more than H 2 million per annum.
2. Banking — commerical, merchant and development banking.
3. Insurance--al1 classes.
4. Mining and quarrying,
5. Basic iron and steel manufacture,
6. Cement manufacture,
7. Petro-chemical feed stock industries,
8. Fertilizer production,
9. Pulp and paper mills.
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10. Plantation sugar and processing.
11. Salt refinery and packaging.
12. Construction industry.
13. Plantation agriculture for tree crops, grains and other
cash crops.
14. Textile manufacture industries.
15. Internal air transport industries.
16. Oil milling and crushing industries.
17. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, machinery
and equipment, tractors and spare parts thereof.
18. lighterage,
19. Wholesale distribution of imported goods.
PROPOSED SCHEDULE III.
All other enterprises not coming within Schedules L or II
above should have a minimum Nigerian participation of 40
per cent.
The second stage of the indigenization scheme shall
come into effect not later than December 31, 1978, This will
give time for efficient execution of the scheme. The Minis¬
tries of Justice and Industries are directed to ensure that
all legislation, reorganization and strengthening of the
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board and other preparatory
work should be completed forthwith.
Source: Nigerian Government White Paper issued in 1976,
p, 3936,
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enterprises, and frequent amendments providing for exemptions
on flimsy grounds." The panel apportioned blamed for these
misdemeanors equally between foreign owners and "Misguided
Nigerian citizens.
According to Central Bank of Nigeria statistics, about
1,200 companies sold their shares to Nigerians as of December
31, 1977, valued at $353.7 million or M 235.8 million.
What is more interesting is the mechanics of the transfer.
In many cases, commercial banks advanced credits to privi-
*
lodged individuals and corporations to acquire shareholdings.
The Lagos Stock Exchange should not be surprised by the small
number of companies that went public, As a matter of fact
companies that decided to go public were oversubscribed in
some cases as much as 800 per cent.^^
While accepting most of these criticisms the government
pointed out that "the extended use of the definition of Ni¬
gerian citizenship was infact a deliberate government policy,
especially where this relates to the exclusion of fellow
* *
Africians from the applicability of the decree."
★
The total amount of loans granted by commercial banks
for the purchases of shares and businesses under the indigeni-
zation scheme showed a remarkable increase in 1979. Between
December, 1978 and December, 1979, the aggregate amount of
loans outstanding in this area had increased by H 11.3 million
or $16.95 million (90,9 per cent) to N 23.7 million or
$35.55 million.
This was in direct contrast to the Business Promotion
Act in Ghana that expelled thousands of African Nationals
many of whom are in business at Ghana
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The panel recommended that immediate steps including
punitive action should be taken to ensure compliance with the
decree by defaulting enterprises.^^ These include empowering
the Business Promotion Board (the body charged with carrying
out the decree) to seal and takeover defaulters, a tightening
up of citizenship laws, a requirement that purchasers should
provide proof of payment lin cases of suspected "fronting"]
and a periodic review of the exemptions granted,
★
Turning to the structural deficiencies of the decree,
the panel defined six areas where failure had occurred:i.Lack of power of the Board to seal up de¬
faulters ;ii.Failure to make more companies indigenise
by issuing shares through the Lagos Stock
Exchange;iii.Failure to match equity participation with
management control •,iv.Failure to provide for prior Board or capital
issues committee approval of all share prices;v.Failure to lay down the basis of ensuring
a wider spread of shares sold; andvi.Weak and under-staffed administrative
machinery to implement the decree.
The panel criticized the Central Bank of Nigeria for be¬
ing too soft with commercial banks that did not meet the
guidelines which required the banks to open new branches in
the rural areas. The estimated new branches should be close
to 261 by 1984.®^ In the past two years (1978-79), the
Structural in this context is viewed in terms of the
organizational pattern.
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twenty chartered banks opened less than 100 branches with
First Bank having open 71 of the 100 new branches. The pur¬
pose of the opening new branches in rural areas was a bid by
the government to harmonize the economy.
It was clear, even before the Civil War started in July
1967, that there were many structural contradictions in
the Nigerian economy - the concentration of basic social and
ancillary amenities, job opportunities with higher wages in
urban areas (towns) vis-a-vis the rural areas. This has been
primarily responsible for the rural - urban migration in
Nigeria and the resultant urban unemployment and social pro¬
blems .
6 3
The panels final recommendation, which the government
intended to implement to ensure that Stage II of indigenization
will not suffer from similar defects. Of these, the most in¬
teresting are those dealing with wider ownership of affected
businesses and the expansion of the stock market in order to
achieve this objective, (freer and fairer market in quoted
securities).
CHAPTER III
COMMERCIAL BANKING IN NIGERIA
Commercial banking plays an important role in the pro¬
cess of monetizing an economy. In the course of economic de¬
velopment, it acts as an engine that directs funds to the in-
vestible channels which can either maximize profits or social
welfare.
The greater part of commercial banking in Nigeria is in
the hands of expatriate international organizations whose
main offices are outside Nigeria. They operate as branches of
the same banks in Britain and France. The deposits acquired
in Nigeria have been shown collectively in a single balance
*
sheet. Assets were acquired against those liabilities with¬
out regard to the location of the origin of the deposits
being applied.
The accounting and monetary policies followed by the
foreign-owned (expatriate) commercial banks in Nigeria were
determined by their head offices and were essentially chosen
with regard to the monetary conditions prevailing in Britain
and France. If interest rates increased in the United King¬
dom as a result of a rise in the Bank of England's rate and
the usual accompanying measures; interest rates would also be
raised more or less by all the branches of those banks
★
The limited available dates are not disaggregated into
expatriate and indigenous banks.
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operating throughout the world, without (regard) reference to the
needs or economic conditions of the individual countries in-
volved.
The total of the individual business undertaken in any
particular country was determined by the decisions in the
head office of the banks, and had no direct relationship to
the demand for credit, the state and level of output, and
employment in the country.
Table 5 provides assets and liabilities of commercial
banks. This consolidated balance sheet is drawn up for the
nineteen banks total operations and not for their operations
in Nigeria alone. Also, there is no distinction between the
nature, classification and sizes of the banks listed in the
table with regard to their paid-up capital.
In 1971, the commercial banks collectively had total
cash balances of $57.6 million, $37.8 million of these balan-
*
ces were held in Nigeria while $19.35 were held in other
banks abroad. During the same year, total loans and advances
amounted to $753 million. Also, they had investments worth
$487.2 million in Nigeria and their total assets were $1,913.85
million.
*
This figure excludes overseas branches of the expatriate
banks.
For an in-depth analysis, see Table 10. Analysis of
Commercial Bank Loans and Advances on Chapter Four.
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Table 5.
COMMERCIAL BANK'S STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
($ MILLIONS)
Cash Balances Held With
1


















1971 57.6 37.8 19.35 57.15 753 487.2 N.A. 1,913,85
1972 $ 65.55 34.35 12.45 46.8 929.25 627.75 0.15 2,156.25
1973 $ 98.7 38.55 89.85 1,130.25 1,130.25 636.75 N.A. 2,658.
1974 $ 497.1 72.75 91.95 164.7 1,407.15 1,167.45 N.A. 4,216
1975 $1,243.05 117.75 148.2 275.7 2,305.95 1,248 N.A. 6,462
1976 $1,641. 199.65 229.2 438.45 3,184.35 2,025.45 N.A. 9,557.1
SOURCE: CBN, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 17, #1, June 1979, p. 51.
N.A. means not available
Exchange rate, one dollar equal one and a half naira ($1//,50N)
♦Excludes expatriate banks overseas operation.
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Comparatively, 1974 figures shows an increase over 1971
figures. Total cash holdings increased from $57.6 million to
$497.1 million. The total cash balances held in Nigeria and
abroad in 1971 was $57.15 million, but in 1974, it increased
to $164 million loans and advances also showed a noticeable
*
increase from $753 million to $2,305.95 million in 1974.
Also, total investments in Nigeria increased from $487.2 mil¬
lion to $1,167.45 million in 1974.
Another characteristic of commercial banks in Nigeria
prior to the indigenization decree was that such institutions
concentrated their local lending on the foreign-owned indus¬
tries operating in the country, such as the United African
Company, John Holt & Company, and the Kingsway Department
★ ★
Stores. Little inclination was shown to extend credit to
Nigerian merchants to the magnitude that would place them in
a strong competitive position with such well established mer¬
chandising firms named above; thereby, perpetuating the mo¬
nopolistic strength of these large firms.
The concentration of lending to foreign-owned and oper¬
ated business led to the development of an enclave, especially,
in the export sector, and thus perpetuated the dependence of
■k
The increase in loans and advances, reflects commer¬
cial banks contribution in the indigensization scheme by pro¬
viding funds to eligible Nigerians so that they can purchase
shares.
★ ★
There is no supportive data available.
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the country on primary export production. These activities
★
also inhibited the growth and occupational mobility of
Nigerian traders.^®
Expatriate banks' executives were all Europeans, lack¬
ing the intimate relationship with Nigerians which is es¬
sential for successful finance of the "indigenous enter¬
prises." In addition, the foreign banks retained the con¬
ventions and standards which banks used in highly developed
economies. One might say that for safety and profitability,
such policies were in line with profit maximizing principles
only. But such high standards tarnished their image and per¬
ception by the indigenes and was the subject of criticism
69
by the Trevort Report.
In the Report, it was documented that the small amount
of lending to Nigerians limits the indirect benefits of
expatriate banking, since without close contacts with
Nigerian enterprises, the banks have only a limited capacity
to improve Nigerian business methods.
According to Dr. N. Azikiwe, "there was an apprehension
of conspiracy of the Bank of British West Africa limited to
create monopoly in banking throughout the federation of
Nigeria . . . Many Nigerians, also felt that the expatri¬
ate banks were deliberatly discriminating against Nigerian
This is true., especially, when majority of the traders
are mainly unskilled and illerate.
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businessmen and competing unfairly against the indigenous
banks.
The indigenous banks used the unfair banking practice
and discrimination argument when they sought aid from the
regional governments. The history of National Bank describes
vividly how persuasive these argument were.^^
INDIGENOUS BANKS
Indigenous banks are incorporated within the country
owned and managed by Nigerians. Between 1951 and 1954,
several abortive attempts were made to establish locally-owned
and managed banks to break the foreign monopoly in banking
which proved unviable. Very few banks survived beyond two
years of their inception. The others folded up almost as
rapidly as they were set up due to inadequate capital and
staff, over expansion and other structural handicaps.
In view of the low level of income enjoyed by most Ni¬
gerians, indigenous banks attracted small demand, time and
savings deposits. The indigenous commercial banks are quite
happy to accept savings account on which the average balance
is very high. Such accounts seem popular with traders. The
expatriate banks in contrast, would not maintain such accounts.
They would consider many of them wholly uneconomic. In an ef¬
fort to encourage thrift, some indigenous banks had special
-45-
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schemes to encourage seasonal savings; the national banks
7 2
shilling fund and Christmas fund" being cases in point.
Between 1973 to 1976, there was a significant increase
in demand, time and savings deposits. Demand deposits in¬
creased from $646.05 million in 1973 to $6,199.05 million in
1976. Likewise, time deposits increased from $536.7 million
in 1973 to $4,511.4 million in 1976, and savings deposits in¬
creased from $336.75 million in 1973 to $2,275.8 million in
1976. Based on these figures, one can infer that the campaign
for increased savings paid off. The increased savings could
also be as a result of increased earnings and income acquired
from petro-dollar sales.
The habits of Nigerian Bankers regarding the holding of
cash are still subject to change and it depends on economic
conditions prevailing at the time. Hence, there is no sta¬
bility in the holdings of individual banks as a group. Ac¬
cording to the commercial banks statement of assets and lia¬
bilities cited earlier. Total cash balances held by banks in
1971 was $57.6 million, it increased to $65.55 million in
1972, $98.7 million in 1973, $497.1 million in 1974, $1,243.05
million in 1975 and $1,641 million in 1976.
Other methods used to attract funds from the public in¬
cludes frequent advertising in the local media, (radio, tele¬
vision, trade magazines and billboards) designed to appeal to
the nationalist feeling.
* *
The source of the data, is the CBN Economic and Fi¬
nancial Review, Vol. 17, #1, June 197 , p. 32, [Table 3(b)].
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The advances of the indigenous banks consist of both
loans and overdrafts and are all made to the indigenes. The
charges made for advances vary between banks, customers and
the type of advance. Table 6 shows selected predominant
interest rates charged by commercial banks. First class
advances was granted at 7 per cent in 1973/74, but there
was a one per cent rate reduction in 1975/76. Produce ad¬
vances to the marketing board was 10 per cent in 1973/74,
but reduced to 9 per cent in 1975, and 8 per cent in 1976.
Overdrafts seem to be granted at rates between 8-12 per
cent during the period under consideration. Loans on property
mortgages are usually made at 12% per cent, unsecured loans
on promisory notes at 45 per cent; the two latter rates, being
★
the maximun permissible under the Money Lenders Ordinance.
Prior to the Nigerian Indigenization Decree, all indi¬
genous banks offer "ancillary services" to their customers and
the public beyond the acceptance of deposits and the granting
of advances. The most important of these are the collection
of bills and drafts of exporters; the opening of credits for
importers; the remittance of funds within Nigeria, between
towns and cities and abroad; acting as shipping agents; pro¬
viding commercial informations of interest of importers and
exporters; and the creation of a commercial library as well
73
as legal department.
Although, the indigenous banks operate according to the
*
Ordinance Number 49 of 1949.
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Table 6.
SELECTED PREDOMINANT INTEREST RATES {% PER ANNUM)


























Dec. 1973 3 3% 3h 4 3 4 7 8-12 10 10
Dec. 1974 3 3% 4 3 4 7 8-12 10 10
Dec. 1975 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 8-12 9 9
Dec. 1976 2 2% 3H 3J5 4 5 6 8-12 8 10
SOURCE: CBN Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, June 1979, p. 34.
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normal commercial banking principles; it might be asked, what
can indigenous bankers hope to do that expatriate bankers with
their greater resources, expertise and greater experience
could not do better? Proponents of the decree had hoped that
the indigenous banker should be able to use his greater know¬
ledge of Nigerian businessmen to make better decision about
the credit worthiness of his customers. They also presumed
that the. indigenous banker could show the businessmen how to
keep better records and could advice him about purchasing
suitable and efficient equipments.
The indigenous banks have not done as might have been
expected of them during the post-indigenous era, especially,
*
in the area of farm fanance. Though, they have come a long
way, they are still plagued by the burden of mismanagement,
accounting incompetence, trained staff and support personnels
74
shortages.
The hypothesis that the branching policies of the indi¬
genous banks appear to be more liberal than those of their
expatriate competitors is tested in the analysis that follows,
A. Soyode and T. A. Oyejide - in their studies - "Branch
Network and Economic Performance; a study of Nigeria's
commercial banks;" market share and profitability in commercial
75
banking: The case of Nigeria" tested the relationship
between expatriate banks branch network and economic
*See the chapter on rural finance for further details.
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performance. Their study also showed that this relationship
was in fact negative, especially for the Nigerian's indigenous
commercial banks.
They identified various interesting dimensions of com¬
mercial banks branch networks. The starting point in their
exercise was a comparison of individual commercial banks in
terms of sizes and the number of their branch offices.
A comparison of each bank's share of total assets with
its share of branches shows an interesting pattern. The top
three banks in terms of assets [Barclays, Standard and United
Bank of Africa] which owns 50.42 per cent (15.85% + 23.91%
+ 10.66%) of total assets, have similar share of branches,
★
only 1.7 per cent collectively. (See Table 7).
For the indigenous banks, the pattern is reversed; ex-
'fc "fc
cept for the Bank of the North, each indigenous bank's share
of total assets is less than its share of branches. For in¬
stance, Barclays Bank (Nigeria) with 23.91 per cent of total
assets has only 2.58 per cent of the branches. On the other
hand. National Bank which has only 5.93 per cent of total
*Sum of bank branches minus # of branches operated by





Bank of the North originated as a foreign owned and
controlled bank. Although, it is now an indigenous bank, its
policies still effects the circumstances surrounding its origin.
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Table 7 .




$Mi11ion % No. %
Standard Bank (Nigeria) 544.785 15.85 65 2.64
Barclays Bank (Nigeria) 822.015 23.91 71 2.58
United Bank for Africa 366.39 10.66 22 3.09
★
National Bank 203.685 5.93 56 17.02
Bank of the North. 214.44 6,24 15 4.56
★
Wema Bank 19.53 0.57 12 3.65
Note: *, refers to indigenous banks
Exchange rate, one naira = $1.50
In, 1974, there were 329 bank branches in Nigeria.
SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement
of Account, Dec. 31, 1974.
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assets commands 17,02 per cent of the branches; and Wema Bank
which has 0.57 per cent of total assets commands 3.65 per
cent of the branches. T.A. Oyejide and A, Soyode's findings
concur with my general hypothesis - that "the branching poli
cies of the indigenous banks appear to be more liberal than
those of their expatriate competitors,"
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CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A VIABLE
RURAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
Over the years, many causes for the phenomenon of agri¬
cultural stagnation have been documented. For instance, the
Nigerian Minister of Agriculture commissioned a combined team
of Nigerians and world bank experts in January 1980, to ex¬
amine in-depth the food situation in Nigeria and to identify
broad programs and strategies that will lead to an early a-
chievement of self sufficiency.^^
The team of experts drew up a food production plan for
Nigeria. The plan contained far reaching recommendations on
all aspects of food production, including crops, livestocks
and fisheries. It also recommended a number of institutional
and policy reforms to improve the extension services output
7 8
delivery, input subsidies, marketing, storage and credit.
The rural sector of the Nigerian population can be dis¬
tinguished from the urban sector in terms of the volume of
non-agricultural occupation within the two sectors. Economic
activity in the rural sector depends directly or indirectly
on the exploitation of land. It centres principally around
farming, animal husbandry, poultry, fishing, forestry, food
processing and cottage industry. It is estimated that agri¬
cultural activity occupies four-fifths of the rural populat¬
ion of Nigeria.^^
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A typical Nigerian rural farmer is usually a small¬
holder, in most cases planting an area of some 1.5-2 hectares,
frequently divided into small and sometimes scattered plots.
The size of the farm differs according to the pressure of the
population of the land. The area farmed by an individual is
generally smaller in the southern than in the northern parts
of the country.
In Nigeria, most family heads were allocated land rights
by their tribal chiefs and by their birth rights. This has
caused land to be subdivided to such an extent that most of
these people lived at or near the poverty level. As a result,
the males are forced to supplement their incomes elsewhere,
This means that no stable farming cornmunity has evolved but
instead, inefficient and wasteful methods of farming are still
practiced.
Land and labor have remained the most important factors
in the production of crops and livestocks for home consumpt¬
ion and export/agro-based industries. Most Nigerian peasants
do not employ animal or mechanical power for ploughing or
harvesting and rarely use fertlizers and other non-farm in¬
puts. The latter requires a considerable investment outlay
and demand for credit by farmers. In contrast, the capital
requirements of subsistence farming as practiced in Nigeria
are simple and relatively inexpensive. The peasant farmers
provides from his own resources, the tools of his trade which




The land tenure system gives the Nigerian peasant free
access to land, and as long as he produces for his subsis¬
tence, his demand for land remains relatively small and can
be satisfied within the compass of traditional tenure. The
practice of mixed and continuous cropping, ensures some de¬
gree of regularity in the supply of basic foodstuff in the in¬
terval between two harvests of the main subsistence crops.
The system of shifting cultivation or bush fallowing provides
where land is still abundant a simple and inexpensive method
8 2
of preserving the soil fertility,
Nigeria's major food crops consists of starchy roots
and tubers [cassava, yams, cocoyams, potatoes and plantains];
grains and cereals [maize, millet, sorghum, rice and kola-
nuts].
Table 8 shows an estimated yield of major crops and
cash crops produced in Nigeria from December 1970 to December
1975. In 1970/71, 1,2625 kilogramme of cassava was produced.
The total production steadily declined for subsequent product¬
ion periods - 11318 in 1971/72, 7,478 in 1972/73, 8,066 in
1973/74, 8,631 in 1974/75 - However, yams, rice and millet
production showed some increases during the period under con¬
sideration. In order to find out how relevant this estimated
yield data is, let us take a look at the estimated areas under
cultivation.
According to the data on Table 9 which shows an esti¬
mated areas under cultivation for major food crops, 1970-75
in thousands of hectares. In 1970/71, cassava was cultivated
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Table 8.

















1970/71 12625 5492 7992 1002 630 1134 233 - - - - -
1971/72 11318 4000 8159 1064 592 1395 211 - - - - -
1972/73 7478 5102 8871 609 648 1886 166 - - - - -
1973/74 8066 6623 8111 715 671 1304 162 - - - - -
1974/75 8631 4444 10656 912 1160 1952 374 - - - - -
SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 15, #2, 1977, December, p. 17.
Note:
(i)—.means not available
(ii) Kg 1 Ha means kilogram per hectare
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Table 9.

















1970/71 920 250 1222 1431 4905 246 3772 10 - 1848 - -
1971/72 899 200 1197 1197 4788 200 3791 10 - 1796 - -
1972/73 844 266 788 1050 3692 237 2466 7 - 2032 - -
1973/74 861 167 855 1130 5651 373 3256 7 - 2076 - -
1974/75 815 108 671 579 4787 269 2937 8 - 1796 - -
SOURCE: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economics and Financial Review, Vol, 15, i2. December 1977, p. 16.
Note; - Means not available
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on 920 thousand hectares, cocoyams on. 250 thousand hectares,
yams on 1222 thousand hectares, corn (maize) on 4905 thousand
hectares, rice on 246 thousand hectares, groundnuts on 1849
thousand hectares, cowpeas on 3772 thousand hectares and wheat
on 10 thousand hectares. However, in 1974/75, the figures for
cassava, cocoyams, yams, corn, rice, groundnuts, and wheat
were as follows; 815, 108, 671, 579, 269, 1796, and 8 thou¬
sand hectares. All of the crops cited with the exception of
rice, witnessed a reduction in areas under cultivation.
The reasons for the reduction in areas under cultivation
is a function of many factors such as the level of farm prices,
returns to investment and the efficiency of the marketing
system. The behavior of yields of the major food crops during
this period was broadly similar to that of land areas culti¬
vated. As indicated earlier, the yields of the root crops and
tubers have shown only slight increases. A variety of factors
have combined to keep the yields low. Of great importance is
the uncertainty of rainfall which can be debilitating under
rain-fed farming. The availability of rainfall ranges from
heavy rainstorms to severe drought, both of which are inimi¬
cal to crop production. Another important factor is soil
ferti1ity.*
During the same period, there has been a growing demand
For detailed analysis, see Hans Ruthenberg, Farming
Systems in the Tropics, Oxford 1971, p. 45.
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for farm credit, which role from $10.5 million in 1970, to
$13.8 million in 1971, $28.8 in 1972, $32.4 in 1973, $40.8 in
1974, and $55.95 in 1975. (See Table 3.0, for an analysis of
commercial bank loans and advances). It is useful to examine
briefly potential sources of funds for farm investment.
In Nigeria, there are two main sources from which agri¬
cultural credit can be obtained: the organized sector and the
unorganized market. In the latter, the sources of funds are
largely non-institutional money lenders, landlords, shop¬
keepers, relatives, bequested estate and personal savings.
Business is conducted usually on a personal basis and it is
not subject to any standard procedure. The rate of interest
is usually prohibitive in this market because of the lack of
any control over the activities of the participants.
Funds could also be obtained from the organized market
comprising such institutions as commercial banks, cooperative
societies, development and financial corporations and other
specialized agencies set up by the government. The conditions
and terms of credit in this sector are standized, while in¬
terests rates are controlled. In spite, a recent study has
found that the unorganized sector is the main source of credit
8 3
for the agricultural sector in Nigeria.
Another important organized source of credit is the co¬
operative societies. These societies usually extend credit
facilities to their members, and most of the loans are quite
small and mainly short-term. Although, their activities maybe
•*54a
Table 10.






















1970 $ 10.5 9.9 115.35 45. 48.3 104.25 90.0 28.5
1971 13.8 17.4 179.55 55.95 84.6 137.55 94.65 47.7
1972 28.8 15.3 216. 73.8 110.55 135.45 75.3 66.6
1973 32.4 9.45 274.8 114.9 127.35 129.9 138.0 77.55
1974 40.8 387.75 18.3 146.7 147.15 131.55 121.65 98.85
1975 55.95 616.05 24.45 319.2 216.45 150.9 345.9 123.
1976 119.4 913.5 21.9 618.45 315.15 144.75 300.9 271.05
SOURCE: CBN, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, June 1979, p. 33.
Exchange rate one naira equals $1.50
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important to their members members, their overall impact as a
source of credit for improving the agraian sector has not been
all that impressive.
In keeping with my general hypothesis as was shown in
the last chapter, there is a general urban bias of bank branch
location and concentration. Very little money has really flown
into the argicultural sector from organized banking industry
so far. Table 10 on commercial bank loans and advances supports
this argument. In 1970, bank loans and advances to the agri-
cultural sector was $10.5 million, while during the same year,
$9.9 million went to manufacturing, $115.35 million went to
mining and quarrying, $45 million went to real estate and con¬
struction, and $28.5 million went to transportation/communi¬
cation.
However, 1975 figures attest the claim that the hypothe¬
sis have maintained that rutal finance has been a neglected
sector by the commerical banks. Only $55.95 million went to
agriculture, while a whopping $616.05 million went to manu¬
facturing, $319.2 million went to transportation.
A translation of Table 10 using 1970-75 United Nations
estimates of rural population in Nigeria show some interesting
patterns. For instance, in 1970, of the $10.5 million ad-
*
vanced to the primary sector, only $100 went to the farmer
•k *
while the secondary and tertiary sector receiving
*The primary sector consist of agriculture, forestry and
fishinq .
•k k
The secondary/tertiary sector consist of manufacturing,
real estate/construction and transportation/communication.
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Table 11.














as % of total
Population
1970 66,174, 13234.8 20% 52939.2 80%
1971 67,856, 16285.44 24% 51570.56 76%
1972 69,581, 14612.01 21% 54968.99 79%
1973 71,350, 24972.5 35% 46377.5 65%
1974 73,163, 27070.31 37% 46092.69 63%
1975 75,023 29258.97 39% 45764.03 61%
SOURCE: Population estimates collected from World Banks - World Table. Published for the World Bank -
The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980, pp. 150-1.
Distribution of Nigerian population in percentile collected from Nigerian annual abstract of
statistics: Lagos Federal Office of Statistics, 1970.
Table 12.
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS AND ADVANCES ON PER CAPITA BASIS
USING RURAL POPULATION FIGURES ('000)
Year Primarv Sector Secondary and
—
Tertiary Sector
1970 $10.5 = .0001 $83.4 = .0015
52939.2 -52939.2
1971 $13.8 = .0002 $121.05 = .0023
51570.56 51570.56
197? $28.8 = .0005 $155.7 = .0028
54968.99 54968.99
1973 $32.4 = .0006 $201.9 = .0043
46377.5 46377.5
1974 $40.8 = .0008 $633.3 = .0137
46092.69 46092.69
1975 $55.95 = .0012 $1058.25 = .0231
45764.03 45764.03
SOURCE; Collected from World Banks World Tables. Published for the World Bank, The John Hopkins Univer¬
sity Press, Baltimore, 1980, p. 150-1.
Data Compiled, using 1970-75 rural population figures.
-The primary sector consists of agriculture, fishing and forestry.
-The secondary and tertiary sector consist of manufacturing, real estate/construction and
transportation/communication.
-All commercial banks loans and advances are denominated in millions of dollars.
-All rural population estimates are denominated in thousands.
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$83.4 million in loans and advances, have a per capita dis¬
tribution of $1,500. Subsequent years figures (See Table 3.2
attached) shows that the disparity between the primary sector
and the secondary/tertiary sector have widened to an even
greater extent.
The commercial banks with the resources of funds to as¬
sist in the transformation of traditional Nigerian agriculture
do not cater to the needs of the peasant producers for credit.
There was very little agricultural credit in the sense of the
farmers receiving loans and advances for the purchase of seed,
planting, harvesting and for holding livestocks.
The inference drawn from the analysis is that the credit
policies of these banks (commercial banks) are understandably
geared to the needs of commerce and industry which meet their
rigid repayment schedules and provide adequate collateral
security for their loans. According to H. A. Oluwasani and
J. A. Also, "the repayment schedules of commercial banks are
generally inflexiable and unsuited to the realities of agri¬
cultural production with its longer term gestation and short
85
(term) run violent fluctuations in yields and prices.
RURAL - URBAN DIMENSION OF
BANK BRANCH CONCENTRATION
As in the distribution of most other modern services in
Nigeria, there is a clear pattern of bias on the part of com¬
mercial banks for urban locations. In the particular case of
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commercial banks, there is admittedly, the obvious economic
justification for this pattern of behavior - the major urban
cities provides the immediate bases and sources of commercial
banking business and profitability. This prompted A. Soyode
and A. Oyejide to question whether those indigenous banks
which are being nutured by various state and regional govern-
8 6
ments are also subject to this profit motivated urban bias.
For an answer, let us examine the tables- attached.
Table 13 provides a break down of bank branches in
terms of their location by size or type of town. Three types
of towns are identified: rural, urban and large urban, where
rural towns are defined as towns with population less than
20,000; urban as those with population at least 20,000 but less
than 100,000; and as large urban those with population of
100,000 and over,®^ (using the 1963 population census as a
basis of population projection).
The table confirms the general urban bias of bank branch
location mentioned earlier. Of all the banks listed in the
table only about 15 per cent of the total number are located
in the rural areas, while a hefty 54 per cent of these branches
serve the large urban centres. For instance, the city of
8 8
Lagos, has over 100 banks (headquartered and branches) alone.
On the disaggregated level, only three banks [that is, Wema,
Pan African and New Nigeria] have 25 per cent or more of their
brahcnes in towns classified as rural.
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Table 13.




Rural Urban Large Urban
Branches Percent Branches Percent Branches Percent
Standard Bank 65 8 12.31 18 27.69 39 60.00
Barclays Bank 71 14 19.72 26 36.62 31 43.66
United Bank of Africa 22 4 18.18 1 4.55 17 72.27
National Bank 56 4 7.14 18 32.14 34 60.71
African Continental Bank 33 5 15.55 12 36.36 16 48.48
Bank of the North 15 2 13.33 5 33.33 8 53.33
Bank of India 1 - - « - 1 100.00
Co-op Bank of Western Nigeria 15 - - 7 46.67 8 53.33
International Bank 5 - - - - 5 100.00
Mercantile Bank 5 1 20.00 4 80.00 - -
Bank of America 1 - - - - 1 100.00
Wema Bank 12 3 25.00 2 16.67 7 58.33
Pan African Bank 11 5 45.45 3 27.27 3 27.27
Arab Bank 1 - - - - 1 100.00
Co-op Bank of Eastern Nigeria 11 2 18.18 5 45.45 4 36.36
TOTAL 329 51 15.41 101 30.51 177 53.80
Rural Towns: Defined as towns with population less than 20,000.
Urban Towns: Defined as towns with population at least 20,000, but less than 100,000.
Large Urban: Defined as towns with population of 100,000 and over 100,000.
SOURCE: A. Soyode and T.A. Oyejide Branch Network and Economic Performance: A Case Study of Nigeria's
Commercial Banks', Discussion Paper No. 75-02.
-means not available
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It is clearly no accident that 13 of the 16 banks have at
least 40 percent of their branches located in the large urban
centres, only one [ that is, national bank] is indigenous.
Thus, while the urban bias is generally strong for the whole
of the commercial banking system in Nigeria, it is particu¬
larly, so far the expatriate banks and the profit motivated
attempt to cling to large urban centres is reduced to some
extent, in the case of indigenous banks.
Newlyn, in his survey of banking in twenty-five British
89
colonies, found that the density of branch banking was
lowest in Nigeria with an average of 962,000 persons per bank¬
ing offices in Nigeria and a total population estimated over
50 million, each banking office in Nigeria served an average
population of over 250,000 in 1962.
While this represents a considerable improvement, Nigeria
would still be near the bottom of Newlyn's list, even assuming
no improvements in the other countries. And According to re¬
cent statistics, Nigeria, is shamefully underbanked at present
with fewer than 800 branches for a population conservatively
90
estimated at 80 million.
Apart from agriculture, there are many other productive
fields whose contribution to the total economic well-being of
the rural community are immense. The small scale and cottage
industries, and also self employment of individuals like the
village carpenters, painter and professionals like engineers,
doctors, and pharmacist would be a very productive field of
finance for the commercial banks.
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Bctending banking business to rural areas raises the costs of
operating. Moreover, lending for agriculture is more risky as
a result commercial banks have therefore confined their busi¬
ness to the less riskly and less costly ventures concentrated
in urban areas. Profitability is no doubt a sound consider¬
ation in many fields of economic activity, but individual
(business) profitability need not always concide with social
profitability or the good of the society as a whole.
It is possible that the extension of business to rural
areas by the commercial banks may not prove to be profitable
for some years to come, but the society as a whole may gain
from this by way of increased availability of food-grains,
raw materials for exports and for the ensuing industrial base.
It may increase the incomes and savings of the cultivators and
eventually turn rural banking into a profitable business.
POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Nigeria needs a comprehensive approach in adopting a food
promotion strategy. The main objective should be to make ef¬
ficient use of the available land, labor and capital to raise
income and generally reduce the rural-urban income gap. This
involves eliminating the various marketing inefficiencies by
investing in transport facilities, information, storage and
the development of non-farm activities such as food processing
and small-scale industries in the rural sector.
-60-
In addition, some institutional changes that will re¬
form the land tenure system to permit more efficient use of
land, and such changes that will restore a balance in research
between export and food corps, need immediate government
attention.
Some of the revenues from petroleum should be invested
in the rural sector to solve these problems, to increase avail¬
able and effective food supply in Nigeria. The commercial
banks have an important role to play towards reducing rural
poverty, unemployment and income inequality.
A number of factors are responsible for the relatively
slow growth in available food supply. The lack of credit is
a major contributor for the relatively slow growth in avail¬
able food supply. This claim is further indicated by the
pattern of branch locations of commercial banks.
It is only by adopting liberal policy measures with re¬
gard to location of branches, credit advances and other an¬
cillary services that commercial banks can contribute signifi¬
cantly towards reducing rural poverty, unemployment and in¬
come inequality.
CBN was too soft with commercial banks that did not meet
the guidelines which required the open of new branches in
rural areas. It was estimated that about 261 new branches
should be opened by 1984, in the past two years 1978-1980,
less than 100 branches were opened by the 21 chartered banks.
There is an urgent need to expand banking facilities
in the states and regions which are 'underbanked.' As the
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commercial banks enter the field of agricultural finance, they
will be faced with certain important decisions. The first is
that of location, while making the choice of a location for
a bank, greatest care will have to be taken. In the first
place, trade and marketing centres in the rural areas which
are not being served by any financial institutions should be
given preference and the centres chosen should have the po¬
tential of ultimately emerging as a 'growth centre'.
One of the important tasks before the banks operating
in rural areas is to mobilize rural savings. At present (not
all), the rural community is used to banking procedure and
their savings if any, are used unproductively.
If the bank habit is to be fostered among the villages
(rural dwellers), these conditions must be satisfied: firstly,
absolute confidence in banks is to be created among the people.
Education would make them realize the need for an usefulness
of savings, but it they are to be persuaded to put their money
in the banks they should be assured of the safety of their
savings;
Secondly, a certain degree of secrecy is to maintained
in respect of each account, for the villager does not like
his neighbours or the Internal Revenue Service knowing how
much money he has accumulated; and
Thirdly, the bank account should be easy to operate be¬
cause we are dealing here with illiterates and the money that
is deposited in a bank should be made available to the de¬
positor when he needs it without any irksome delay. The failure
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of the rural credit co-operatives in Nigeria and the continued
success of the village money lender illustrate the significance
of this point.
One of the stumbling block to farm finance is credit
worthiness. A new set of policies must be developed such that
the credit worthiness of rural borrowers need not be measured
as it was being measured until this time (hitherto). But, it
has to to be judged from the potential credit-worthiness and
the improvements which could be brought about by making
available to them a small advance.
CONCLUSION
This study has endeavored; (1) to outline, describe
and critically analyze the Nigerian Indigenization scheme on
commercial banking in Nigeria and its overall benefits to the
economy - mainly towards greater participation of Nigerians
in the growth and destiny of the economy -; (2) to outline
the history, origin and functions of the CBN, beginning in
1959 to 1980; (3) to survey the CBN's economic and develop¬
ment contribution to the Nigerian economy in contrast with
those of the commercial banks; and (4) to survey the forces
responsible for the limited development of a viable rural
financial sector.
The first chapter of the study has attempted to explain
the history and origin of the CBN, its developmental role which
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includes the promotion of the local money markets designed to
provide outlets for commercial banks fast growing idle funds.
The development of an indigenous capital market has also been
the concern of the CBN. So, in 1961, the bank set up the
Lagos Stock Exchange and it supported the Nigerian Stock
Exchange during its early years. The bank established
specialized financial institutions such as the NIDB and the
NAB.
Chapter two has attempted to explain how the Nigerian
Indigenization Decree affected the banking industry and the
future prospects of the industry. Before 1972, Nigeria had
no ordinance referring specifically to enterprising operators.
It was not until April 1, 1974, that the country under the
indigenization decree established the modus operandi.
The Nigerian Indigenization Decree was a measure
brought into force by the government to greatly increase the
local, shareholding and participation in foreign companies
operating in the country, many of them British, The Nigerian
indigenization was a gradual attempt to deforeignize the
country's economy. It does mean that the indigenes would
assume greater flexibility and responsibility for the owner¬
ship and management of the modern sector.
The decree was an attempt by the government to reduce
the proportion of profits made by foreign enterprises in
Nigeria that is transferred to Europe.
According to CBN statistics, about 1,200 companies sold
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their shares to Nigerians as of December 31, 1977. The decree
affected many foreign firms, mainly British firms involved in
42 per cent of the cases, French firms allowed with 10 per
cent and the United States with 7 per cent. The government
decreed that all controlling shares in all formerly foreign
dominated banks must be in Nigerian, principally government
hands. The foreign banks that compiled are Union, or Braclays
Bank DCfi, Standard Bank and United Bank for Africa.
Many Nigerians, including employees of the companies
themselves have secured bargains. There has been apprehension
that too many of the shares are now in the hands of two few
individuals, concentrated mainly in the Lagos areas where the
headquarters of most of the companies are situated thereby
creating a new class of millionaires. The concentration of
shares in two few individuals prompted the panel set up to
evaluate the indigenization scheme to question the geographical
spread of share purchases.
The panel in their report on the problem of indigeni-
zation so far have been twofold: firstly, there have been
downright evasion and dishonesty. Secondly, there have been
what one might term structural failures - the spread of owner¬
ship of foreign businesses has been concentrated into few
hands. The panel also found that the main devises used to
circumvent the decree included fronting, application for
naturalization, extended use of the definition of Nigerian
citizenship, problem of classification of enterprises and
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frequent amendments providing for exemptions on flimsy grounds
The panel apportioned their blame for the misdemeanors equally
between foreign owners and misguided Nigerian citizens.
Chapter three and four have dealth with the commercial
banks, their locational pattern and their (lending) credit
and advancement policies and their contributions if any to the
development of a viable rural sector.
Commercial banks continues to be an urban-oriented serv
ice. Very little money has really flown into the rural areas
from organized banking industry so far and this is a sharp
contrast to the role played by the CBN which have increased
the flow of credit to the agricultural sector via the aid of
the agricultural credit guarantee fund.
A translation of Table 10 show some interesting pattern
In 1970, of the $10.5 million advanced to the primary sector,
only $100 went to the farmer while the secondary and tertiary
sector receiving $83.4 million in loans and advances have per
capita distribution of $1,500.
A number of factors are responsible for the relatively
slow growth in available food supply. The lack of credit is
a major contributor for the relatively slow growth in avail¬
able food supply. Coupled with the uncertainty of rainfall
and the land tenure system. Rural finance is a neglected
sector by the commercial bank and the pattern of branch
locations of commercial banks further justifies the claim.
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